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Hick and Radhakrishnan on Religious Diversity: 
Back to the Kantian Noumenon 
 
The ongoing debates over the religious pluralism of John Hick have highlighted what 
are, in effect, two primary modes of visualizing doctrinal and experiential diversity 
across the world’s religious traditions. The traditional strategy, that spans the options 
labelled as ‘exclusivism’ and ‘inclusivism’ in the literature, is centred on the concrete 
focus of Christ, with other religions placed at varying distances of spiritual efficacy 
with respect to this foundational truth. The ‘pluralist’ strategy associated with Hick 
consists of re-imagining these religions, each with its distinctive focus such as Allah, 
Brahman, or Vishnu,  as charged with transformational capacity not because they are 
literally accurate descriptions of the ultimate but because they are capable of 
metaphorically gesturing towards this ultimate. A vital debate emerges at this point 
between the defenders of this pluralist hypothesis and its detractors over whether 
these foci are metaphysically real or unreal. Hick’s pluralism faces the following 
dilemma – if these foci are taken as absolutely real, their specific characterizations 
would be attributed to the ultimate which he argues is ineffable, but if they are taken 
as absolutely unreal, he would have accepted a naturalist interpretation of religious 
discourse which he otherwise rejects.  
 
With this conceptual background in mind, we shall pursue three primary objectives in 
this essay.  First, we shall examine certain conceptual instabilities in Hick’s pluralism 
in the light of S. Radhakrishnan’s approach to religious diversity which is based on a 
reformulation of classical Advaita. Second, our analysis of Hick’s and 
 
 
 
 
Radhakrishnan’s views will illuminate the significance of ontology in certain 
proposed typologies of religious pluralism. Third, we will be able to revisit, through 
this dialogue between Hick and Radhakrishnan, the intensely vexed question of 
whether Hick’s version of pluralism is in fact a form of covert exclusivism. The 
comparative perspective that we shall explore here would seem promising on at least 
three accounts. First, Hick himself often quoted Radhakrishnan’s translations from the 
Upanishads in support of his own claims about divine ineffability, transformative 
experience, and religious pluralism. Indeed, Radhakrishnan’s statements on the 
relation between the ultimate and the world’s religions can often sound Hickian. For 
instance, emphasising that the religious traditions are diverse culturally-shaped 
attempts on the part of human beings to respond to the ultimate, he argued: ‘Religious 
experience is not the pure unvarnished presentment of the real in itself, but is the 
presentment of the real already influenced by the ideas and prepossessions of the 
perceiving mind’ (Radhakrishnan, 1927:24). Secondly, both Hick and Radhakrishnan 
operated with an appearance–reality distinction in developing their views on the 
significance of religious diversity. Thirdly, and crucially, while Hick adapted this 
distinction from Kant, Radhakrishnan derived it ultimately from Śaṁkara (c.800 CE), 
and these two distinctive points of origin lead to somewhat different types of 
reconstructions of the diversity of world religions. Our argument in the following 
sections will highlight the point that Radhakrishnan is not a ‘pluralist’ in terms of 
Hick’s understanding of the Real. The Advaitin ultimate, while it too like Hick’s Real 
cannot be encapsulated by human categories, is, however, not strongly ineffable, 
because some substantive descriptions, according to the Advaitin tradition, are more 
accurate than others. Our comparative analysis will reveal that these reconstructions 
differ because they are located in two somewhat divergent metaphysical schemes. 
 
 
 
 
Religious Pluralism: The Contemporary Debate 
 
 In a classic statement of the Christian approaches to religious diversity, Alan Race 
classified John Hick as a pluralist (Race 1983). With an appeal to the Kantian 
distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenal world, Hick (1989) positions 
the major religious traditions of the world as authentic responses to the noumenal 
Real. This implies that the (phenomenal) personae and impersonae attributed to the 
divine in the different religions such as Sunyata in Buddhism, Allah in Islam and the 
triune God in Christianity do not apply to the (noumenal) Real an sich (in itself).  A 
variation on this pluralism is the soteriocentrism of Paul Knitter who wishes to 
highlight the soteriological emphasis that is present in many religious traditions 
(Knitter 1987). At the same time, however, some thinkers grappling with the 
philosophical implications of religious diversity have noted that terms such as 
‘exclusivism’, ‘inclusivism’, and ‘pluralism’ are often not sharply defined. For 
instance, pointing out that sometimes the same theologian has been described as an 
exclusivist and as an inclusivist, Paul Hedges (2008: 21) notes that these categories 
should be seen not as closed essences but as fluid approaches with permeable 
boundaries. For an instance of how a theologian can straddle the boundary between 
‘inclusivism’ and ‘pluralism’, we may consider S. Mark Heim who argues, on the one 
hand, for the plurality of distinct religious ends, and claims, on the other hand, that 
Christian salvation is more inclusive, valuable and truth-filled than the goals 
postulated in the other religions. The variety of religious ends is grounded in the 
mystery of divine providence, so that these should not be labelled as incorrect or 
anonymous versions of the Christian goal. Instead, one should speak of a plenitude of 
salvations (in the plural) which would lead a dialogue of difference across religious 
 
 
 
 
traditions. However, while these religious ends other than salvation are real, Heim 
affirms that Christians in fact ‘hope to be saved from them, and believe that God has 
offered greater, more inclusive gifts’ (Heim 2001: 19). Therefore, not all of these ends 
are equally valuable, and those who realise ends other than salvation, that is 
communion with the Triune God, have achieved ‘a lesser good’ (Heim 2001: 44). The 
contemporary debates over defining ‘pluralism’ indicate that the vital question often 
is not ‘whether pluralism’ but ‘which pluralism’? – a question which involves the 
specific metaphysical-epistemological presuppositions undergirding a theologian’s 
pluralism. As we will see, these presuppositions play a crucial role in structuring 
Hick’s and Radhakrishnan’s re-constructions of the world’s religious traditions.  
 
The Two Strands of Hick’s Pluralism 
 
Hick postulates the noumenal Real, which is not experienced as it is in itself, in order 
to integrate two facets of his understanding of religious experience in a world of 
religious diversity. The first realist strand contains a top-bottom emphasis on the 
noumenal Real which is mediated through human cultural contexts, and the second 
neo-Wittgensteinian strand a bottom-up emphasis on the creative attempts of human 
minds to elaborate historically-contextualised religious responses of overcoming 
absorption in self and becoming centred in the Real. These two emphases lead to a 
conceptual tension in Hick’s pluralism. The first suggests a radical 
incommensurability between human concepts and the trans-categoreal Real, thereby 
underscoring the point that the latter is the ontologically independent ground which 
cannot be encapsulated by tradition-specific categories. The second, however, 
suggests that human contexts of ego-negation and the Real are minimally analogous, 
 
 
 
 
for in the absence of any such correlation, there would be no means of indicating that 
it is these contexts, and not contexts of ego-affirmation, that are authentic expressions 
of the Real. To ease this tension, Hick proposes his hypothesis of religious pluralism 
which works from both ends: working with the view from below, he inductively 
gathers the religious traditions which cultivate ego-transcendence, and provides a 
view from above in which these traditions are oriented towards the un-
conceptualizable Real. The tension persists, however, precisely because no 
substantive predicates can be applied to the Real; a tension that, as we will note in 
subsequent sections, emerges for a different reason in Advaitin contexts as well. 
 
First, against naturalistic interpretations of religious discourse, Hick speaks of the 
‘basic faith’ that phenomenal religious experiences are not mere human projections 
but are grounded in a transcendental reality. Therefore, the Real an sich is postulated 
‘as the presupposition of the veridical character of this range of religious experience’ 
(Hick, 2004: 249). Since without the noumenon, the various culturally shaped divine 
personae and impersonae that constitute the religious history of humankind would be 
illusory, Hick suggests that the Real to which different characteristics are attributed 
by the religious traditions is ‘the noumenal ground of these characteristics’ (Hick, 
2004: 247). While the Real is beyond all human categoreal dualities such as personal 
versus impersonal, substantial versus insubstantial, and so on, the Real is not a 
nothing or a blank but a ‘reality lying outside the scope of our human conceptual 
systems’ (Hick, 1995: 28). In this strongly realist strand of Hick’s thought, the 
noumenal Real, which is experienced and thought by different human beings from 
within their specific cultural milieus, ‘exists independently of our perception of it and 
the phenomenal world is that same world as its appears to our human consciousness 
 
 
 
 
…’ (Hick, 2004: 241). Hick argues that human transformations from ego-affirmation 
to ego-denial are taking place more or less to the same extent in different religious 
systems with their distinctive deities and absolutes, and suggests that we explain these 
patterns by regarding them as ‘different manifestations to humanity of yet a more 
ultimate ground of salvific transformation’ (Hick, 2000: 58–9). Hick applies the 
principle of credulity, which states that it is rational to suppose that one’s experiences 
are veridical in the absence of strong defeating conditions such as abnormal 
physiology or environmental features, to religious contexts to argue that religious 
experiences, which are seemingly of the divine, can be taken as veridical. Hick argues 
that that ‘if it is rational for the Christian to believe in God on the basis of his or her 
distinctively Christian experience, it must by the same argument be rational for the 
Muslim ... for the Hindu and the Buddhist ... on the basis of their own distinctive 
forms of experience’ (Hick, 1985: 103). The ontologically independent status of the 
Real is further emphasised by Hick when he speaks of the noumenal Real as the 
source of the informational input whose influence, through collaboration with the 
human mind, produces the phenomenal diversity of religious experiences (Hick, 2004: 
243).    
 
Second, against traditional interpretations of religious doctrine as possessing literal 
truth, Hick emphasises the creative dimensions of human culture, history, and myth in 
shaping religious traditions with distinctive types of belief, practice, liturgy, poetry 
and so on. Unlike Kant who operated with twelve trans-culturally valid categories of 
the understanding, Hick argues that the Real is apprehended not only through certain 
universally shared forms and categories but also by variations shaped by linguistic 
structures, cultural styles, symbolic patterns, and so on. Hick emphasises the human 
 
 
 
 
side of the contribution when he argues that whether divine Reality is experienced as 
personal or impersonal depends on the mode, whether I–Thou encounter or non-
personal awareness, in which individuals seek to relate themselves to the Real (Hick, 
2004: 245). To be oriented towards the Real, it is not essential that individuals accept 
the doctrinal statements of religious orthodoxy, such as the divine Incarnation in 
Christianity or reincarnation in Hinduism, as literal truths. Rather, these should be 
understood as mythical evocations of attitudes and forms of behaviour which are 
conducive to transformations away from self-centredness to Real-centredness (Hick, 
2004: 248). In such passages, Hick emphasises the active constructing dimensions of 
the mind which imagines various symbolic descriptions of the divine. All such 
linguistic devices are partial attempts to capture aspects of the ultimate, and these 
human descriptions  do not properly apply to divine existence (Hick, 2004: 246). 
 
At this juncture, the two strands discussed above begin to pull apart. The realist strand 
emphasises the ontological independence of the Real, the unexperienceable ground of 
concrete religious responses. However, the constructivist strand raises the possibility 
that the Real, about which nothing substantial can be known, can be regarded as a 
mere conceptual fiction. Since no substantive properties can be attributed to the Real, 
Hick’s pluralism seems to provide no means of determining why all conceptual 
structures should not be viewed as elaborations of a humanly projected Real. As Alvin 
Plantinga argues: ‘If we know nothing about the Real, we have no reason to pick the 
personae Hick picks as authentic manifestations of it. The main point is that if the 
Real has no positive non-formal properties of which we have a grasp, then, for all we 
can see, any department of human life is as revelatory of the Real as any other’ 
(Plantinga, 2000: 59). Plantinga is here discussing Hick’s distinction between formal 
 
 
 
 
and substantial properties, such that only the former, for instance, the property of 
‘being able to be referred to’, apply to the Real, and not the latter, for instance, Christ, 
Vishnu, Buddha and so on (Hick, 2004: 239). However, a close examination of Hick’s 
understanding of the Real, highlighted in the realist strand above, shows that he does 
attribute substantive properties to the Real, because the Real is that which is real in 
the fullest sense – ontologically independent, fully existent, and unlimited (Ward, 
1990: 9).  Hick argues that he employs the term ‘Real’ in the singular, when there is 
no a priori reason why ultimate reality cannot consist of an ‘orderly federation or a 
feuding multitude or an unrelated plurality’ (Hick, 2004: 248). His response reveals 
that he regards the Real to be that which is unsurpassably real: ‘we affirm the true 
ultimacy of the Real by referring to it in the singular’ (Hick, 2004: 249). Further, in 
order to affirm that contexts of transition from ego-affirmation to ego-negation are 
oriented towards the Real while contexts of transition from ego-negation to ego-
affirmation are not, Hick’s Real would minimally have to be the ground of the former 
and not the latter. Therefore, given that the Real is postulated as the ontological 
support of only those traditions within which the transformation of human existence 
from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness is taking place, and not vice versa, a 
Hickian could supply such a description as a substantive property of the Real and 
argue that not just any aspect of human activity is revelatory of the Real after all 
(Hick, 2004: 240). Hick himself, of course, would have resisted such a move, for it 
brings the Real within the fray of the competing divine personae and impersonae with 
which the Real should not, according to him, be confused. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hick and the Kantian Noumenon 
 
At this stage of the argument, we can see that a key debate between Hick and his 
critics is over whether the Real an sich should be regarded as an ontological category 
that is radically distinct from or partly continuous with its phenomenal manifestations, 
a question that will also emerge in our discussion of Radhakrishnan. The former 
option allows Hick to affirm the ontological independence of the Real and reject 
projectivist interpretations of religious discourse offered by figures such as Freud, 
Marx and Nietzsche. He argues that the various ways in which human beings have 
been striving to effect ego-negation are all rooted in the noumenal ground, ‘rich in 
content’, which transcends all these experiences (Hick, 2004: 247). The emphasis on 
the ineffable Real, however, can become a form of ‘transcendental agnosticism’: 
because no positive descriptions of the Real are accessible to us, the Real threatens to 
become a limiting idea with no content (D’Costa 1991). Therefore, in response to 
Feuerbach’s challenge that the denial of all positive predicates to the divine nature is, 
in effect, a denial of religious discourse, Hick would have to supply some substantive 
properties of the divine (Eddy, 1994: 472–3). The second option allows Hick to 
highlight only certain contexts, namely, those effecting a reversal of egotism, as 
rooted in the Real, though at the cost that the numerous seemingly incompatible 
properties of divine personae and impersonae would have to be attributed to a unitary 
referent (Netland, 1986: 258–61). Hick seeks to address this problem by invoking the 
wave-particle duality of quantum physics to suggest that the noumenal Real which is 
beyond all human conceptualisations is somehow continuous with the expressions of 
the Real. Just as depending on the experimental conditions, light has been found to 
demonstrate wave-like or particle-like properties, likewise the Real, which cannot be 
 
 
 
 
known directly, can be experienced in various contexts as personal or impersonal 
(Hick, 1995: 25). 
 
The Real, it would seem, is both ontologically different from and continuous with its 
phenomenal expressions, in different parts of Hick’s system. The oscillation between 
these two poles is also a notable feature, according to some Kant scholars, in Kant’s 
own views about the relation between the noumenon and phenomenal experience. 
While Hick himself claims that questions concerning Kant exegesis are not relevant to 
his application of certain Kantian insights to the epistemology of religion, debates 
over the noumenon, in fact, impinge on the conceptual tension we have highlighted in 
the preceding section (Hick, 1995: 240). According to Kant, the passive faculty of 
sensibility receives intuitions through the forms of time and space, and the active 
faculty of understanding classifies them through the categories into a law-governed 
world. Thus, everyday objects of experience are, in his words, transcendentally ideal 
and empirically real, which is his famous doctrine of transcendental idealism. 
However, Kant’s division between the phenomenal objects of everyday cognition and 
the noumenal ground of these objects has been read in two ways. According to the 
first ‘two-worlds’ interpretation, the appearances and the things in themselves are 
metaphysically distinct, and according to the second ‘two-aspects’ interpretation, the 
appearances and the things in themselves are numerically identical entities considered 
respectively from an empirical and an transcendental perspective. According to the 
first, appearances and things in themselves are numerically distinct entities which are 
related through a process for which Kant uses terms such as affection or grounding 
(A19/B33). That is, everyday experience involves the things in themselves ‘affecting’ 
the mental representations structured by the forms and categories of the mind. For 
 
 
 
 
textual support, proponents of this interpretation appeal to statements such as the 
following: ‘beings of understanding certainly correspond to the beings of sense’ (B 
308–309) (Kant, 1997: 361), ‘cognition reaches appearances only, leaving the thing in 
itself as something actual for itself but uncognized by us’ (Bxx) (Kant, 1997: 112), 
and so on (Gardner, 1999: 271). In contrast, Henry Allison, a prominent defender of 
the second, argues that this division is used by Kant not to draw a distinction between 
two realms of beings, one consisting of appearances and the other of suprasensible 
entities, but to highlight the limitations of our cognitive powers (Allison 1983). 
Proponents of this interpretation appeal to the following type of statements from Kant: 
‘The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a boundary concept, in order to 
limit the pretension of sensibility, and therefore only of negative use’ (A255/ B311) 
(Kant, 1997: 350). In other words, while we encounter objects which are always 
already shaped and structured by our cognitive faculties, we can consider, and not 
cognize, those same objects apart from any determinate relationship to these faculties. 
That is, the noumena are purely mental entities which are posited by the 
understanding and have no mind-independent being (Janz, 2004: 141). 
 
In light of these interpretive disputes, some scholars have argued that Kant formulates 
his doctrine of transcendental idealism in a variety of ways and it is not immediately 
obvious whether, and how, his statements can be reconciled into a self-consistent 
doctrine (Wood, 1005: 63–64). For instance, Karl Ameriks notes that while the view 
that noumena and phenomena are ontologically identical has the advantage of not 
hypostatizing another world, it does not completely explain why Kant often speaks of 
the unknowability of things in themselves, or about distinguishing things in 
themselves from appearances (Ameriks 1982). For some interpreters of Kant, the 
 
 
 
 
strongest argument for the view that noumena are ontologically real is derived not 
from Kant’s epistemology but from his moral philosophy, for, according to Kant, we 
have grounds to believe in a free noumenal self which is not an object of experience 
necessarily subject to complete causal determination (Adams 1997). As Merold 
Westphal notes, summarising these debates: ‘The thing in itself has always been a 
thorn in the flesh to those who would read Kant carefully and sympathetically at the 
same time … But the thing in itself lies at the heart of Kant's great achievement. 
Without it the distinction between transcendental ideality and empirical reality is 
vacuous … Without it the purported orginality of the Copernican Revolution is 
reduced to the giving of fancy names to familiar distinctions’ (Westphal 1968: 119). 
Our purpose, however, is not to settle these fine points of Kant exegesis but to 
indicate how some of the ambiguities reappear in the Hickian system.  
 
On the one hand, as we have noted, Hick argues that the Real an sich is the 
ontological ground of its numerous phenomenal manifestations, and speaks of the 
Real as providing inputs into these historical formations. In such passages, which 
seem to echo the ‘two-worlds’ view, Hick shares a Kantian concern to explain the 
diversity of objects of experience, whether sensory or religious (Palmquist, 1993: 
178). The noumenon therefore highlights the passivity of the faculty of sensibility – 
since what is structured by the understanding is given through intuition, the latter 
input in our cognitive experience is supplied by the noumena. As we have seen, Hick 
too emphasises that the divine personae or impersonae are not merely human 
projections but are responses to the divine information that shapes them. Therefore, 
the Real an sich exercises some measure of external constraint on the religious gods 
and absolutes. Further, in the manner of Kant who argues that while we cannot 
 
 
 
 
cognize noumena we can think about them, Hick often emphasises that his Real an 
sich is a hypothetical ground that is posited, and not directly cognized, to meet certain 
explanatory needs of his religious pluralism. While this postulation prevents his 
system from moving in the direction of a radical subjectivism, it arguably attributes to 
the Real an sich the substantive property of producing the phenomenal religious 
expressions. Indeed, Kant struggled with a similar problem of speaking about the 
noumenon without using any descriptions derived from the twelve categories of the 
understanding which according to him have only empirical employment. Therefore, 
regarding Kant’s description of noumena as the ‘ground’ of phenomenal experience, 
Allen Wood writes that Kant uses it ‘perhaps because it seems to him more abstract 
and metaphysically non-committal, better suited to express a relation that can never 
be cognized empirically but only thought through the pure understanding’ (Wood, 
2005: 64). 
 
 On the other hand, Hick in fact rejects the ‘two-world’ interpretation of Kant which 
would suggest that in addition to phenomenal particulars such as leafs, pencils, and 
horses there exist discrete noumenal correlates. He reads Kant as saying that the 
sensory manifold is structured by the mind’s innate forms and categories to appear in 
one unitary consciousness, such that ‘the phenomenal world is that same noumenal 
world as it appears to our human consciousness’ (Hick, 2004: 241). The analogy that 
he prefers is that of unbroken sunlight which is refracted by the atmospheric particles 
into a rainbow, and the Real which is categorised by numerous human cultures into 
their gods and absolutes (Hasker, 2011: 199). Another analogy that he uses is that of a 
table which is apprehended by us in everyday life as a solid, hard, brown and 
enduring three-dimensional object and which is described by physicists by using the 
 
 
 
 
vocabulary of quantum events (Hick, 1997: 285). Just as Martians, with sensory 
capacities and processing systems different from those of ours, would perceive the 
‘table’ in different ways, different spiritual practices – some characterised as I-thou 
prayer and others as non-I-thou meditation – would be structured around alternative 
awarenesses of the transcendent. His ‘two-aspect’ interpretation therefore allows him 
to argue, closely echoing Kantian vocabulary, that the divine phenomenal 
manifestations ‘are not illusory but are empirically, that is experientially, real as 
authentic manifestations of the Real’ (Hick, 1995: 242).  
 
Hick and ‘Polytheism’ 
 
The dilemma that Kant faces seems to be this: the metaphysical interpretation gives 
rise to an inconsistency in utilising the phenomenal category of cause to speak of the 
noumenon affecting the phenomenon, whereas the epistemic interpretation which 
rejects the ontological independence of the noumenon pushes his doctrine in the 
direction of Berkeleyan phenomenalistic idealism (Wilkerson, 1976: 195). In 
importing the Kantian noumenon–phenomenon distinction to his religious 
epistemology, Hick faces a similar dilemma with respect to the relation between the 
Real an sich and the phenomenal gods and absolutes. While Hick needs a 
metaphysical reading of this distinction to the extent that he wishes to affirm that the 
divine personae and impersonae are not purely human projections but are rooted in 
the Real which is external to them, this reading attributes to the Real the substantive 
property of influencing these manifestations. An epistemic reading of the distinction, 
which he explicitly favours, on the other hand, could imply that the personal deities 
and the transpersonal ultimates of the religious traditions are purely human imaginary 
 
 
 
 
constructs which are superimposed onto a limiting idea, substantivally vacant, called 
the Real. The presence of both these readings of the Kantian apparatus in Hick’s 
system leads to a tension between, on the one hand, his combination of transcendental 
idealism and empirical realism and, on the other hand, his symbolic expressivist view 
that doctrinal statements are not factual truths but evocative myths. Regarding the 
former, William Alston argues that in the manner of Kant who restricted theoretical 
knowledge to the phenomenal world, Hick argues that the divine personae and 
impersonae have phenomenal reality and that we cannot have any substantive 
knowledge about the transcendental Real. On the other hand, Hick argues that the real 
content of doctrinal statements in the world religions should be understood in terms of 
their symbolic-expressive capacity to evoke appropriate dispositional attitudes. 
Therefore, the personae and impersonae should not be located in the Real (Alston, 
1995: 42–3). 
 
The vital question that emerges is this: how real are the divine personae and 
impersonae? To the extent that they are affected by the Real, they are not illusory, 
while to the extent that they are human responses to the Real they are, in fact, only 
penultimate metaphorical pointers to the Real. Indeed, as George Mavrodes puts it, 
the gods and absolutes of the religious traditions in Hick’s pluralism seem to have ‘at 
best a very tenuous and weak reality’ (Mavrodes, 1997: 290). Mavrodes’ observation 
seems to be supported by Hick’s own claim that someone who accepts his neo-
Kantian distinction between the Real, on the one hand, and the experienced god-
figures and the non-personal absolutes, on the other hand, is ‘at one level a poly-
something, though not precisely a poly-theist, and at another level a mono-something, 
though not precisely a monotheist’ (Hick, 1997: 283). More precisely, Hick argues 
 
 
 
 
that the ‘experienced Thou’ should be seen as analogous to the Hindu devas (gods) or 
Abrahamic angels which are ‘intermediate beings’ between devotees and the trans-
categoreal Real (Hick, 2004: xxx). In other words, the multiple gods are not distinct 
ultimates, ontologically independent noumena but are phenomenal, culturally-shaped 
manifestations. Therefore, while personae such as Amida, Yahweh, Vishnu and 
others are real persons, they should not be regarded as an infinitely supreme Being but 
as finite intermediate figures which are human projections in response to the universal 
presence of the Real (Hick, 2004: 275). William Hasker therefore argues that we 
should speak of the relation between the noumenon and the phenomenal appearances 
not in terms of identity but of manifestation: the various personae and impersonae are 
multiple modes in which the Real is manifested to us in specific cultural matrices, and 
these modes possess the properties that are attributed to them. In other words, a 
specific locus of worship in a religious tradition is not the Real in itself but is related 
to the Real insofar as it is the Real as manifested in the context of that tradition 
(Hasker, 2011: 191). 
 
Radhakrishnan and the Kantian Noumenon  
 
When we move from Hick’s pluralism to Radhakrishnan’s reconstruction of religious 
diversity, a few parallels between the two viewpoints stand out immediately. The 
similarities have sometimes been noticed by commentators on Hick’s pluralism. For 
instance, L.P. Barnes, argues that ‘Hick's teaching on the nature of the Absolute, and 
his conviction that there is one essential truth underlying all religion, is strikingly 
similar to the teaching of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. This is noteworthy when we 
consider that Radhakrishnan was a Hindu who wrote from a Vedantic monistic 
 
 
 
 
perspective’ (Barnes, 1983: 227–28). We find a similar Hickian emphasis in 
Radhakrishnan on the rejection of religious orthodoxy which is associated with 
dogmatism, persecution and intolerance; the affirmation of interreligious 
conversation, dialogue and harmony; and the aspiration to build a world-community 
grounded in the transcendent which surpasses the denominational differences across 
the religious traditions. Equally crucially for our purposes, Radhakrishnan’s 
articulations of these themes resonate with Hick’s neo-Kantian emphasis on the 
creative dynamic activity of human minds in their specific contextual backgrounds. 
For instance, Radhakrishnan argues that the differences across world religions are 
legitimized by the fact that they are partly a product of an individual’s temperament, 
one’s location in a finite cultural environment, and one’s daily experiences—and out 
of this crucible there emerge different religions with distinct emphases. Therefore, 
Radhakrishnan emphasizes at several places in his writings that the different religions 
of the world, with the specific impulses and values that they embody, should come 
together in a relationship of mutual friendship so that they are regarded ‘not as 
incompatibles but as complementaries, and so indispensable to each other for the 
realization of the common end’ (Radhakrishnan, 1927: 46). What he envisioned was 
not a ‘featureless unity of religions’ but a rich harmony that will preserve the integrity 
of each (Radhakrishnan, 1967: 134). In this context, Hinduism is marked out by its 
‘catholic’ vision that accepts all the different ideas of the supreme reality and 
recognizes that different human beings have attained different stages of spiritual 
perfection and, consequently, seek the ultimate in different ways and in different 
directions: ‘By accepting the significance of the different intuitions of reality and the 
different scriptures of the peoples living in India, Hinduism has come to be a tapestry 
 
 
 
 
of the most variegated tissues and almost endless diversity of hues’ (Radhakrishnan, 
1927: 20).  
 
A closer inspection of Radhakrishnan’s reconstruction of the Advaita of Śaṁkara, 
however, reveals that his standpoint of religious diversity diverges at a significant 
point from Hick’s pluralism. Unlike Hick who viewed the personae and the 
impersonae of the world’s religious traditions as human projections in response to the 
Real, Radhakrishnan regarded only the transpersonal descriptions of the Real 
provided by the Advaitic tradition as ultimately reflecting the nature of the Real. 
While Hick maintained that his pluralism should be seen not be as a conclusive ‘meta-
theory’ about religious diversity but as a conditional hypothesis (Hick, 1995: 42), 
Radhakrishnan did not view Advaita as a hypothetical reflection on the world 
religions. That is, while Hick argued that the ineffable Real  did not have any 
substantive properties, Radhakrishnan affirmed that certain descriptions of the 
transcendent, namely, those which indicated its nature to be transpersonal were 
ultimately more accurate than those which indicated its nature to be personal. As we 
examine this divergence in greater detail in the subsequent sections we will note that 
it can be traced also to a fundamental difference between Hick and Radhakrishnan 
regarding their views over the Kantian noumenon. Radhakrishnan affirms the 
possibility that Hick disallows – that human beings can, in some sense, know the 
noumenon. 
 
Advaita and the Metaphysical Status of the Phenomenon  
 
As we saw earlier, Hick’s views on whether the personae and the impersonae were 
 
 
 
 
real or unreal have been read in various ways. In an article which started the 
discussion on this specific topic, Mavrodes (1997) took these divinities and absolutes 
to be full-bloodedly real and called Hick the most distinguished exponent of 
polytheism. Hick’s response, which lies in characterising them as ‘intermediate 
beings’ between the Real and human cognizers, has suggestive parallels in the neo-
Advaita understanding of the phenomenal world as not absolutely Real, and not 
absolutely unreal either.  
 
Radhakrishnan’s elaboration of the distinction between personal deities and Brahman, 
the Advaitic transpersonal ultimate, is woven into his reconstruction of classical 
Advaita in which he sought to highlight the life-affirming dimensions of the 
Upaniṣads. Radhakrishnan shares this concern with many other neo-Hindu figures 
who have struggled with the exegetical question of what Śaṁkara himself said about 
the status of the empirical world (Singh, 1966: 24). The basic question that the 
Advaitin tradition has struggled with is this: ‘Truth, knowledge, infinitude is 
Brahman. Mutable, non-intelligent, finite and perishing is the world. Brahman is pure 
attributeless, impartite and immutable. The world is a manifold of changing 
phenomena, fleeting events and finite things … The problem for the Advaitin is to 
solve how from the pure Brahman the impure world of men and things came into 
existence’ (Mahadevan, 1957: 227). There are passages in Śaṁkara which seem to 
suggest that the empirical world (māyā) is merely a human projection of the 
individual subject, which is itself an illusory manifestation of the real Brahman, and 
others that the world has some measure of objective reality independently of the 
human subject (Radhakrishnan, 1983: 586–7). A famous couplet which is said to 
summarise the meaning of Advaita would seem to lend itself more readily to the 
 
 
 
 
former reading: ‘The non-duality of Brahman, the non-reality of the world, and the 
non-difference of the soul from Brahman – these constitute the teaching of Advaita’. 
In other words, the sole reality Brahman appears as the empirical universe 
characterised by the diversity of names and forms, which are, however, mere 
limitations superimposed by human subjectivity onto the indivisible Brahman 
(Hiriyanna, 1973: 158). While the first reading, in other words, has a distinctive 
Berkeleyean flavour, Śaṁkara in some passages clearly rejects a certain Buddhist 
view that ‘external’ objects are merely aggregates of psychic phenomena. While the 
Buddhist claims, by appealing to dreams, that the systematicity of our experience can 
be explained without appealing to external mind-objects objects, Śaṁkara seeks to 
show that no such coherent account can be provided. Roughly, Śaṁkara argues that 
the dreams are not self-contained experiences, because it is possible to invalidate 
dreams only from the perspective of the content of waking experience (Ram-Prasad 
1993). Some contemporary scholars therefore accept the second more realist 
interpretation of Śaṁkara and point to passages where he argues that if the world were 
annihilated at the attainment of liberation, it would have been destroyed by the first 
person who attained liberation. Therefore, the so-called annihilation of the 
insubstantial world is to be understood not in terms of a real change, since, as 
Śaṁkara argues, nobody can annihilate the world with all its entities, but as the 
dissolution of the names and forms that are mistakenly superimposed onto Brahman. 
In other words, liberation is a transfigured vision of the plurality of the world’s beings 
as grounded in the foundational unity of Brahman, so that the negation of the world 
‘is more a transformation, re-organisation and revaluation than wholesale 
annihilation’ (Datta, 1963: 345). D.R. Satapathy brings together these emphases when 
he argues that Advaita does not ‘denounce distinction at all in favour of a blind 
 
 
 
 
monism’, but rather ‘seeks to grant and uphold distinction through limiting conditions 
or upādhis as recognition of water bubbles, foam and waves in relation to the sea and 
thus drives the basic point home that though distinct, the world which is the enjoyed 
object is non-different from its ultimate unitary ground, Brahman’ (Satapathy, 1992: 
41). 
 
In light of Śaṁkara’s affirmation of the transpersonal Real and his rejection of 
Buddhist versions of idealism, one could therefore almost attribute to his system a 
Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. That is, 
external objects such as pots are ‘empirically real’, and not merely mirages or dreams, 
but the condition of possibility for human cognition is the ‘transcendentally ideal’ 
foundation of Brahman. However, a crucial difference between the two systems of 
thought needs to be highlighted at this juncture: while Kant repeatedly restricts the 
employment of the twelve categories of the understanding to the phenomenal world, 
the Advaitic tradition argues that the human subject can ‘realise’ its true noumenal 
depths. Radhakrishnan’s criticism of Kant underscore this crucial difference between 
their respective systems of idealism. Radhakrishnan argues that Kant imposed 
‘arbitrary limits’ on the scope of human knowledge when he restricted the mind’s 
ability to know things as they are: ‘If Kant denied this privilege of intuitive 
understanding to man [sic], it is due to his intellectualism…’ (Radhakrishnan, 1932: 
131). He argues that unity and interconnection are not subjectively constituted aspects 
of the world, but are true of objects as they are in themselves. The point about 
‘arbitrary limits’ takes us back to the thorny question of the noumenon which Kant, in 
one passage, characterised both negatively and positively: ‘If by a noumenon we 
understand a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, because we 
 
 
 
 
abstract from the manner of our intuition of it, then this is a noumenon in the negative 
sense. But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition, then we assume 
a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, 
and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a 
positive sense’ (Kant, 1997: 360–61). Kant argues that this intellectual intuition is 
reserved for God, a restriction that Radhakrishnan views as arbitrary: the noumenon for 
the Advaitin tradition is the objectively Real, transcendent ultimate and human beings 
can realise their essential non-difference from the unitary Real.    
   
Radhakrishnan and Hick – via Kant 
 
The crucial disagreement between Radhakrishnan and Kant over the epistemic powers 
of the mind is therefore related to their alternate ontologies.. While both 
Radhakrishnan and Hick work with ‘two-aspect’ interpretations of the relation 
between the Real and the phenomenal in their readings of Śaṁkara and Kant 
respectively, their divergent metaphysical schemes lead to distinctive reconstructions 
of religious diversity.   
 
Radhakrishnan elaborates the realist interpretation of Śaṁkara referred to above, and 
views the phenomenal world (māyā) as possessing some measure of reality, because it 
is grounded in the underlying supreme Reality (Radhakrishnan, 1960: 156). While the 
imperfect transient world is not as Real as Brahman, Radhakrishnan insists that it is 
not ‘a mere mirage’ (Radhakrishnan, 1923: 463). However, while the empirical world 
is always grounded in the transcendent Reality, unenlightened human beings see it as 
unmoored from its true ground and as splintered into numerous disconnected objects. 
The separative consciousness is the ignorance (avidyā) that must be overcome in the 
 
 
 
 
manner in which one’s illusory experience of a snake is overcome when its true 
ground, the rope, is cognized. The ultimate Reality Brahman underlies all finite 
reality, and ‘the appearance of plurality is due to the intellect which works according 
to the laws of space, time and causality’ (Radhakrishnan, 1923: 574).  
 
Radhakrishnan’s understanding of the relationship between the transcendent and the 
phenomenal world can therefore be characterised as ‘two-aspect’: the same ultimate 
Reality appears under human conditions of imperfection as split into many. 
Radhakrishnan argues: ‘The pluralistic universe is an error of judgement. Correction 
of the error means change of opinion. The rope appears as a snake, and when the 
illusion is over, the snake returns to the rope. So does the world of experience become 
transfigured in the intuition of Brahman. The world is not so much negated as 
reinterpreted’ (Radhakrishnan, 1923: 583). Furthermore, for Radhakrishnan, in line 
with Advaitin thought, the empirical world includes the gods of personal theistic 
traditions which are human imaginative constructs superimposed onto the highest 
Reality, the qualityless ultimate (Raju, 1985: 395). Therefore, while the God of 
personal theism is not completely unrelated to the Absolute, in that the former is 
grounded in the latter, nevertheless ‘God is the Absolute from the human end. When 
we limit down the absolute to its relation with the actual possibility [of the universe], 
the Absolute appears as supreme Wisdom, Love and Goodness’ (Radhakrishnan, 
1932: 273). Employing the Advaitin notion of degrees of reality, Radhakrishnan 
argues that the world, which is an effect of Brahman, the transcendent cause, is less 
real than Brahman. Here he follows the post-Śaṁkara Advaita definition of the Real 
as ‘unsublatable throughout the three times (i.e., past, present, and future)’ (Potter, 
1963: 221). God, an inhabitant of the phenomenal world, is therefore less real than the 
 
 
 
 
transpersonal Real which is beyond all human experiences structured by dualities. 
Consequently, Radhakrishnan affirmed that there is a graduated scale of interpreting the 
religious experiences of humanity with the theistic notions at a lower level than the 
transpersonal or the monistic: ‘The assumption of a personal God as the ground of being 
and creator of the universe is the first stage of the obscuring and restriction of the vision 
which immediately perceives the great illumination of Reality’ (Radhakrishnan, 1967: 
122).   
 
Brahman and the empirical world of personal theism are therefore not two different 
kinds of entities – the latter, derivatively real, remains ontologically parasitic on the 
former, the foundational ground of Being. The Advaitic doctrine of degrees of being 
thus enables Radhakrishnan to place the God of theism in a domain that is neither 
absolutely real, nor absolutely unreal, namely, the phenomenal world (māyā). 
However, because his Kantian strictures on the noumenon do not allow him to operate 
with such a metaphysic, Hick has to grapple with the dilemma of consigning the 
personae and the impersonae to sheer unreality (which would push his system in the 
direction of non-cognitivist interpretations of religious discourse) and locating them in 
the Real an sich (which would import substantive properties to the Real). His views 
about the status of the personae have therefore been read in widely divergent ways. 
As we noted above, while Mavrodes once took Hick to be a polytheist, in his reponse 
to Hick’s rejoinder he argued that the personae seem to have ‘at best a very tenuous 
and weak reality’ (Mavrodes, 1997: 290). From Radhakrishnan’s point of view, the 
personae would have precisely such a ‘weak reality’, because they belong to the 
conventionally real (vyavahārika) domain of everyday waking experience structured 
by norms and conventions, which should not be viewed as completely unreal 
 
 
 
 
(tucchika) because it is rooted in the ultimately real (paramārthika) (Shastri, 1936: 
18).  
 
The Ineffable in Hick and Advaita 
 
Given the distinctive metaphysical foundations of the intellectual systems of Hick and 
Radhakrishnan, it follows that while both of them speak of the transcendent reality 
with negative qualifiers such as indescribable, ineffable, inexpressible, 
incommunicable and so on, they operate with somewhat divergent notions of 
ineffability. A pointer to this difference is provided by Hick’s attempt to incorporate 
the distinction between Brahman as personal (saguṇa Brahman) and Brahman as 
transpersonal (nirguṇa Brahman) into his pluralist hypothesis: ‘Theologically, the 
Hindu distinction between Nirguna Brahman and Saguna Brahman is important and 
should be adopted into western religious thought. Detaching the distinction … from 
its Hindu context we may say that Nirguna Brahman is the eternal self-existent divine 
reality, beyond the scope of all human categories, including personality; and Saguna 
God is God in relation to his creation and with the attributes which express this 
relationship, such as personality, omnipotence, goodness, love and omniscience’ 
(Hick, 1973: 144). As we have seen, Radhakrishnan can strike a similar note when he 
argues that God is the Absolute from the human point of view; however, 
Radhakrishnan also affirms that God, who is within the sway of human cognitive and 
spiritual experience, occupies a lower mode of reality than the trans-categoreal 
Absolute.   
 
 
 
 
 
A key question that the Advaitic tradition therefore has struggled with is how to speak 
about the transpersonal Absolute to which no human categories apply. As some 
philosophers have pointed out, a strong doctrine of ineffability which states that 
absolutely nothing can be said about the transcendent is in danger of becoming self-
referentially incoherent in seemingly asserting that the Transcendent is beyond all 
human categories. In response to this problem, Chien-Hsing Ho argues that when we 
state that the Real is ‘unsayable’ this word does not, on the one hand, touch the Real, 
for no words can encompass or circumscribe the Real, and, on the other hand, does 
indeed affirm its unsayability (Ho 2006). Ho’s argument can be strengthened by 
noting how religious traditions such as Roman Catholicism and Advaita Vedānta both 
argue that the Real cannot be touched by human concepts and identify the Real from 
within a metaphysical system which provides patterns of argumentation as to why the 
Real is ineffable. For instance, according to Aquinas, simplicity is an ontological 
property of God; that is, we do know that God is in fact such that the divine nature 
which is infinite contains no parts, no distinctions, and no complexities (Ward, 1990: 
6). Therefore, when Aquinas speaks of God as ineffable, he claims not that nothing 
whatsoever can be said about God – rather, terms that denote positive perfections do 
apply to God provided that they are applied analogically, given the utter simplicity of 
the divine nature. The doctrines of simplicity and infinity of God in the Christian 
tradition should therefore be understood to mean that we cannot know all of the 
divine and not that there is such a radical incommensurability between human 
concepts and the divine that we can never know anything of the divine (Eddy, 1994: 
471).  
 
The view that there is some analogy between human concepts and the ultimate Real 
 
 
 
 
appears also in the Advaitic tradition which has to grapple with a tension between, on 
the one hand, texts from the Upaniṣads which state that Brahman is the ineffable 
ultimate from which all words turn back (Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.7.1) and, on the other 
hand, the tradition’s understanding that scripture describes the Real. A classic 
instance of how Śaṁkara deals with these exegetical strands is his interpretation of 
the text ‘Brahman is reality (satyam), knowledge (jñānam), infinite (anantam)’ 
(Taittirīya Upanisad II.1.1). Julius Lipner argues that Śaṁkara’s interpretation should 
be taken as providing both a definition of Brahman and also facilitating an ‘oblique 
predication’ (laksaṇā) about the nature of Brahman (Lipner 1997). Śaṁkara’s key 
exegetical move depends on distinguishing between the role of adjectival qualifiers 
(viśeṣaṇa) in ordinary discourse which is to distinguish between members of the same 
class (for instance, a red lotus and not a blue one) and their role in definitions which is 
to distinguish the subject from everything else (so ‘reality’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘infinite’ 
applied to Brahman have primarily an excluding function). Therefore, in the 
definition ‘reality’ indicates that Brahman is the originary unchanging cause and not a 
phenomenal entity, and ‘knowledge’ that Brahman is not an unconscious first cause of 
everything. Thirdly, the definition supplies ‘infinite’ to highlight the point that the 
‘knowledge’ in question relates not to everyday cognition which involve a finite 
knower and an object known, but to the foundational ground of Brahman in which 
there are no internal divisions between being and knowing. In short, the positive 
qualifiers ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ retain their proper meanings (svārtha), and can be 
applied to Brahman provided their empirical meanings are carefully purified through 
the use of the term anantam which cautions us that Brahman is beyond all empirical 
finitude. As Lipner concludes, in Śaṁkara’s exegesis, Brahman emerges as ‘utterly 
transcendent yet not as utterly unknowable’ (Lipner, 1997: 314). 
 
 
 
 
 
Śaṁkara’s solution to the dilemma of speaking ‘about’ an ineffable Brahman is 
rooted, therefore, in his understanding of a definition as functioning in two ways: a 
positive function of indicating the proper form (svarūpa) of the definiendum and a 
negative function of distinguish it from everything else. We now return to a point that 
we highlighted earlier about the substantial property of ultimacy that implicitly 
characterises the Real an sich, in spite of Hick’s emphasis that only formal properties 
can be attributed to the Real. Since various religious traditions such as Roman 
Catholicism, Advaita Vedanta, Islam and so on speak of the ultimate as ineffable, we 
are faced with the question of whether we are dealing with one or many such 
ultimates. Hick’s affirmation that all these ultimates proposed from within diverse 
religious traditions are centred in one originative ground, the Real an sich, suggests 
that the Real is a self-existing ultimate principle. Such a suggestion is reinforced by 
his view that while the Real is not a ‘thing’, it is not nothing either, and is the ‘blessed 
unselfcentred state which is our highest good’ (Hick, 1995: 60). In fact, in certain 
places Hick’s comments on the ineffable Real suggest that he does allow some 
measure of analogy between the phenomenal expressions of the Real and the Real an 
sich. He argues, for instance, that the Real is good in the sense that the sun, from our 
human point of view, is good, friendly, and life-giving. Likewise the Real, because it 
is the necessary condition of our existence and flourishing, can be said to be good, 
mythologically and not literally, in relation to us (Hick, 1995: 63). In other words, the 
attempts of Hick and Śaṁkara to approach the ineffable show that in both their 
conceptual systems, apophaticism is densely woven into a pattern of metaphysical–
epistemological arguments that enable us to somehow identify the ultimate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Hick and Radhakrishnan on Religious Diversity  
 
Our discussion in preceding sections has highlighted both certain parallels and 
divergences between the theological-philosophical reconstructions of religious 
diversity in Hick and Radhakrishnan. Both speak of the need to overcome religious 
‘exclusivism’ which is associated with violence, intolerance and persecution of 
dissent, and seek to foster interreligious cooperation by orienting the world’s religions 
around a transcendent source. However, as our discussion of the views of Hick and 
Radhakrishnan on the Kantian noumenon–phenomenon distinction reveals, their 
respective reconstructions of religious diversity originate in two distinctive traditions 
– one an attempt to combine neo-Kantian insights with the phenomenology of 
religion, and the other a reconstruction of classical Advaita. 
 
The crucial differences between Hick and Radhakrishnan can now be summarized. 
Following a ‘two-aspect’ interpretation of Kant, Hick argues that human beings 
develop, through the employment of their cultural categories, their distinctive 
responses to the Real an sich of which they cannot have unmediated knowledge. 
Radhakrishnan’s metaphysics is ultimately drawn from Śaṁkara and he argues that in 
spiritual experience, the phenomenal human subject recovers its true non-duality with 
the noumenal Brahman. Therefore, Hendrik Vroom rightly points out that Hick’s 
‘pluralist hypothesis entails a radical reinterpretation of the Advaita Vedānta 
evaluation of the personal Brahman, which considers saguna Brahman as lower than 
the impersonal nirguna Brahman …’ (Vroom, 1990: 81).  Hick himself noted that his 
pluralist hypothesis is ‘significantly different’ from Advaita with which it has ‘partial 
resemblance’ (Hick, 1980: 110).  
 
 
 
 
 
We have indicated, via our discussion of the status of the Kantian noumenon, that this 
significant difference ultimately stems from their competing metaphysical schemes, 
which imply two distinct notions of religious experience. Hick’s interpretation of 
religion starts not from the Advaitic Absolute but from his claim that there is a rough 
salvific parity, understood in terms of moral and spiritual progress, across the 
religious traditions (Hick, 1995: 48). His hypothesis is developed ‘inductively, from 
ground level’ by examining the world’s religious traditions, and observing that they 
are roughly at par so far as their moral and spiritual fruits are concerned (Hick, 1995: 
50). Interestingly, Radhakrishnan too invoked a similar moral criterion in arguing that 
religious traditions are to be judged in terms not of their theological affirmations, 
social structures or ritual practices but of their ability to foster transforming 
experiences of self-realization. However, for Radhakrishnan the experience in 
question is one in which the sense of a duality between the knower and the known 
dissolves in the realisation of their deeper identity. At the core of all religious 
traditions lies this mystical experience (anubhava) consisting of an undifferentiated 
non-duality between the finite self and the transpersonal Brahman (Radhakrishnan, 
1927: 13). The religious traditions of the world indirectly suggest, through their 
linguistic apparatus, cultural formations and symbolic mechanisms, this integrative 
experience in which all dualities are sublated. Therefore, all views of the one reality are 
not on an epistemic par, and he outlines a scale starting from animistic notions to the 
Advaita Vedānta conception of the Absolute. In his famous words, ‘The worshippers of 
the Absolute are the highest in rank; second to them are the worshippers of the 
personal God; then come the worshippers of the incarnations like Rama…; below 
 
 
 
 
them are those who worship ancestors, deities and sages, and the lowest of all are the 
worshippers of the petty forces and spirits’ (Radhakrishnan, 1927: 32).      
 
Conclusion  
 
Our comparative discussion of Hick and Radhakrishnan reveals the gains and the 
losses, from an epistemic point of view, of two divergent reconstructions of religious 
diversity. Hick’s hypothesis is more capacious in that no metaphysical description 
developed from within the world’s major religious traditions is accepted as an 
accurate re-presentation of the Real, and all these traditions are at par so far as they 
are contexts promoting the negation of self-absorption. For Hick even in unitive 
mysticism of the type intimated by Advaita, what is encountered is not the Real an 
sich but a certain manifestation of the Real (Hick, 1989: 294). However, precisely 
because this Real is substantially vacuous, Hick’s hypothesis is riddled with various 
instabilities relating to the metaphysical status of the personae and the impersonae, 
the opposing pulls between a realist strand and a constructivist strand, and so on. 
Radhakrishnan’s response to religious diversity, in contrast, is more adequately 
characterised not as a philosophical hypothesis but a theologically-grounded 
reflection on the significance of this diversity. Because the Kantian strictures that 
regulate Hick’s hypothesis do not operate in his conceptual system, Radhakrishnan is 
able to employ an Advaitin doctrine of degrees of being to characterise the personae 
as constituents of the derivatively real phenomenal world. While the personal gods of 
the theistic traditions are human constructs, they are rooted in the transpersonal Real.  
Further, the claim that spiritual experience, understood in distinctively Advaitic terms, 
is at the centre of all the world’s religious traditions provides Radhakrishnan with a 
 
 
 
 
much ‘thicker’ criterion than Hick’s substantially empty Real through which to view 
religious diversity.  
 
While Radhakrishnan’s conceptual system, centred around the Advaitic transpersonal 
Absolute, is not structured by the same set of tensions that riddle Hick’s pluralism, it 
has to deal, of course, with precisely the question that Hick could sidestep by 
postulating his ineffable Real – how to establish the cognitive superiority of the 
Advaita standpoint over its competitors, namely, personal theistic faiths such as 
Christianity, Islam and so on. A crucial question that we need to raise at this point is 
the hermeneutical distance between Śaṁkara and Radhakrishnan, who is widely 
viewed as a representative of modern Hinduism. In some presentations of 
Radhakrishnan’s thought, he is regarded as having excised the world-negating aspects 
of Śaṁkara and given Advaita a this-worldly orientation. However, several scholars 
have interrogated the view that Śaṁkara denies the empirical reality of the 
phenomenal world: they have pointed out that Śaṁkara himself criticised certain 
forms of Buddhist subjective idealism, and that Śaṁkara emphasised that the world is 
an insubstantial illusion (māyā) only from the perspective of transcendental 
realization (Grant 1999; Malkovsky 2000). In fact, the difference between the two 
figures revolves around the question not of the empirical reality of the phenomenal 
world, but of whether ‘religious experience’ needs to be located on a scriptural 
horizon. While Radhakrishnan suggests that all human beings can have access, 
unmediated by their cultural backgrounds, to the liberating experience of Advaita, 
Śaṅkara located the possibility of liberating knowledge within a specific culture that 
was constituted by scripture, reliable authorities, performance of one’s caste-duties, 
and so on. It is this interwoven texture of teacher, tradition, and text that provides the 
 
 
 
 
‘external circuitry’ for mental cultivation which is a necessary antecedent to 
enlightenment. Modern Advaitins such Radhakrishnan sometimes invert this order of 
priority by suggesting that there is a pre-linguistic ‘experience’ which is universally 
accessible to all individuals and is not inflected by any cultural moorings (Forsthoefel 
2002). In this vein, Swami Vivekananda sometimes claimed that the Vedas were a 
repository of the spiritual experiences (anubhava) of gifted human beings, who are 
able to verify these laws through a direct apprehension and not a mere study of the 
scriptural texts (Rambachan 1994: 60). Similarly, Radhakrishnan’s own 
understanding of ‘experience’ seems to have been drawn not only from Upaniṣadic 
sources but also thinkers as widely varied as F.H. Bradley and Baron von Hugel 
(Halbfass 1988: 398). However, while Radhakrishnan believed that the Vedas are the 
records of the experiences of the sages who were the ‘pioneer researchers’ in the 
realm of the spirit, Wilhelm Halbfass (1988: 388) has argued that in classical Indian 
thought the Vedas are viewed not as a summary of personal experiences but as an 
objective structure within which reason, exegesis, and meditation played specific 
roles. 
 
Further, Radhakrishnan’s claim that the Advaitic intuitive experience of non-duality 
with the ultimate is the underlying unity across religious traditions has been criticized 
on the grounds that he inflicted interpretive violence on the traditions by focusing 
specifically on only those strands that seem to fit into his vision of a nondualistic 
spiritual experience as the vital core of religion (Yandell, 1993: 18–21). More 
importantly for our purposes, Radhakrishnan’s selective appropriation of texts in 
which he discerns glimmerings of Advaitic thought has also been critiqued from the 
neo-Kantianism of Stephen Katz, which is based on the epistemological principle that 
 
 
 
 
all experience is conditioned by cultural and mental patterns so that the process of 
differentiating patterns of experience into their various symbolic and institutional 
forms takes place not after but during the experience itself. However, in spite of 
Katz’s intention of being faithful to ‘the richness of the experiential and conceptual 
data’ (Katz, 1978: 66) in question, it has been argued that his primary assumption that 
there can be no nonconceptual pure experience denies the particularity of the truth-
claims of a number of Indic traditions such as Hindu yoga and Buddhism. Without 
trying to settle this debate, it is important to note in this context that, while 
Radhakrishnan argued that such a supra-conceptual experience is the vital reality of 
the world religions, in one sense his position does accept the Kantian dichotomy 
between the ineffable noumenal reality and its phenomenal manifestations. He 
emphasized the importance of cultural traditions in shaping human ideas about reality 
and held, in Kantian style, that religious experience is the ‘presentment of the real 
already influenced by the ideas and prepossessions of the perceiving mind’ 
(Radhakrishnan, 1927: 19). Nevertheless, the difference between Radhakrishnan and 
Kant emerges when he goes on to affirm that the ‘prepossessions’ that lead certain 
individuals to interpret this experience through theistic categories are ultimately 
distortive of the nature of noumenal reality, which, unlike Kant, Radhakrishnan held 
to be accessible to the enlightened seers of humanity (Radhakrishnan, 1932: 130–34). 
In short, Radhakrishnan’s view that the intuitive experience that he indicated was 
available to figures such as the Buddha, Plato, Philo, Hillel, and the medieval mystics 
of Islam was based on a very specific conceptualization of such experience as leading 
to a nondual realization of one’s unity with the ultimate reality that has no 
distinctions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, while Hick’s and Radhakrishnan’s re-imaginings of the religious traditions 
are ones that their adherents would usually reject, their revisions are structured by 
alternate metaphysical schemes (Netland, 1986: 255). For Hick, this is the ‘thin’ 
combination of a Kantian ineffable Real and a moral criterion of self-negation; 
Radhakrishnan uses a similar moral criterion which is, however, located within the 
relatively ‘thicker’ framework of anti-Kantian Advaitin metaphysics. The analysis of 
their revisions, structured by two ultimately divergent criteria, reinforces a point that 
some scholars have emphasised – namely, that Hick’s pluralism is built around 
specific, and often highly contested, metaphysical–epistemological normative 
presuppositions. However, the presence of these presuppositions in itself does not 
imply that Hick is an ‘exclusivist’, for Hick’s ‘thin’ ontology denies what 
Radhakrishnan’s relatively ‘thicker’ ontology affirms – that one specific 
conceptualisation of the ultimate has greater salvific/liberative efficacy than the 
others. Our analysis therefore shows that future builders of systems of religious 
pluralism would have to balance the epistemic costs and benefits of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
ontologies, and since such balances are usually of the finer types, debates over the 
conceptual plausibility of such pluralisms are unlikely to arrive at knock-down 
resolutions.  
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